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THE EQillV ALENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND 
DISTRIBUTED MONTE CARLO LEARNING 
Yuya Sasaki 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a tight relationship between evolutionary game 
theory and distributed intelligence models. After reviewing some existing theories 
of replicator dynamics and distributed Monte Carlo learning, we make 
fonnulations and proofs of the equivalence between these two models. The 
relationship will be revealed not only from a theoretical viewpoint, but also by 
experimental simulations of the models by taking a simple symmetric zero-sum 
game as an example. As a consequence, it will be verified that seemingly chaotic 
macro dynamics generated by distributed micro-decisions can be explained with 
theoretical models. 
JEL classifications: C73, C63 
Key words: evolutionary game, replicator dynamics, agent based models, 
Monte Carlo learning, recency-weighted learning 
THE EQUIVALENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND 
DISTRIBUTED MONTE CARLO LEARNING 
1 Introduction: Significance of the Topic 
Evolutionary game theory and computational economics 1 are two ofthe latest 
fields to account for evolutionary processes of economics. When it comes to a 
problem of aggregate behavior, the former seems to have a limited ability to 
incorporate micro behaviors of each economic agent, while the latter often fails 
in formalizing the processes. Indeed, computational simulation practitioners 
empirically know that a collection of rule-based or learnable autonomous agents 
usually leads to an emergent outcome that partially agrees with the theoretically 
expected one, but the process by which distributed intelligence translates to such 
an outcome has been seldom understood (the difficulty of rigorous analyses is 
stated by Maes (1995)). However, the field also exhibits flexibilities which can 
be associated with existing theories of dynamics. 
In this paper, we present the equivalence between the prototype theory of 
deterministic evolutionary games and the computational model of distributed-
agent Monte Carlo learning. Monte Carlo learning was selected mainly for two 
reasons. First, it lays a foundation for many of the other learning algorithms, 
1 Computational economics varies in its sub-fields. For example, there are (i) 
numerical dynamics, (ii) numerical optimization, (iii) heuristic optimization, and 
(iv) bottom-up processes by autonomous entities, etc. In this paper, we will 
narrow-sightedly refer to only (iv) as "computational economics." 
2 
especially Q-Iearning and Sarsa algorithms (Barto and Singh, 1990; Sutton and 
Barto, 1998). Second, unlike evolutionary algorithms, its simple form makes it 
easier to extend the algorithm to be associated with economic theory. Before 
discussing the main ideas, let us identify the relative roles and the historical 
background of evolutionary game theory, computational distributed-agent models, 
and learning. 
Several methodologies have been developed to explain aggregate behaviors 
of multiple economic agents where strategic decision-making is involved. 
Normal-form theoretical models have played a basic role. While bearing out the 
theory of games von Neumann devoted himself to the development of self-
reproductive machines and cellular automata (von Neumann, 1966), that later was 
to produce what is called artificial life or ALife (Langton, 1989). Artificial life has 
in turn motivated computer-based experimental scientists to model games of 
complex systems that generate emergent dynamics. However, few researchers 
have made attempts to merge these two distant fields of von Neumann's legacy.2 
While some economists were acquiring a new model of games which stem 
from the initial developments by Maynard Smith (1974), biologists had started to 
employ computational and individual-based models (ruMs) to examine bottom-up 
2Some early 1990s' pioneering works (e.g. , Holland and Miller (1991); 
Arthur (1993)) have attempted to merge economic theory and autonomous 
intelligence models. Judd (1997) and Judd (2001) discuss the potential roles of 
computational economics in emerging economic theory. 
3 
behaviors of ecological dynamics (e.g., Dewdney, 1984). Today, the contributions 
of IBMs are not restricted to applied problems, but include theoretical problems 
in population and community ecology (Haefner, 1996). On the other hand, the 
theoretical dynamics model of deterministic evolutionary games, or replicator 
dynamics (Taylor and Johnker, 1978; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983),3 was shown 
by Hofbauer (1981) to be equivalent to an ecological dynamics model, namely the 
Lotka-Volterra equation. This sequence of events suggests the possibility of 
merging IBMs into the formulations of deterministic evolutionary games. 
While the deterministic evolutionary games were becoming obsolete for 
game theorists, they certainly absorbed economists in the 1990s (Friedman 
(1991); and for stochastic version later by Kandori et al. (1993)). Unlike the 
passive being of chromosomes in biological systems, economic agents exhibit 
active characteristics (ie. learning). It was therefore a natural course for 
economists to turn their attention to this dynamic aspect (e.g., Roth and Erev, 
1995; Dosi, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, etc.). 
Computational experiments as well as psychological laboratory experiments 
complement theory in this aspect. One way to demonstrate how to use 
computational experiments in learning is to employ agent-based simulations or 
3Extensions and analyses of the replicator dynamics, multi-agent dynamics, 
and other derivatives were made by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988; 1998; 2003), 
Cressman (1992), Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Swinkels (1993), Weibull 
(1997), etc. 
4 
agent-based models (ABMs; also called agent-based computational economics or 
ACE), a sub-field of computational economics (for an overview, see Tesfatsion, 
2002). 
ABMs in economics are the analogues ofIBMs in biology. In ABMs, some 
other forms of learnable functions (e.g., Monte Carlo sampling, statistical 
learning, reinforcement learning, neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, etc.) 
are embedded in each economic agent, and the agents behave autonomously by 
querying their internal function for the optimal actions or strategies given the 
current state of the world. Hence, ABMs conduct the process of strategy 
optimization at a micro level. ABMs are usually employed to explain the 
sophisticated bottom-up processes of evolutionary economics, which would be 
infeasible with top-down theoretical models (Tesfatsion, 2000). While it appears 
that the principles of ABMs researchers and those of game theorists have diverged 
more than converged, the concept of the replicator dynamics roughly agrees with 
simple learnable ABMs, as will be shown in later sections. 
In this paper we begin by briefly reviewing the basis of existing theories of 
deterministic evolutionary games and the algorithm of distributed Monte Carlo 
learning (Sec. 2). Then, our discussion moves on to formulations and proofs of the 
equivalence of evolutionary game theory and multiagent Monte Carlo learning 
(Sec. 3). Our method does not rely on the field's convention of using the 
hypothetico-deductive approach, but will instead start with the somewhat 
5 
farfetched connection of the two models' formulations. In Sec. 4, experimental 
results of ABMs will be compared to the theoretical dynamics model to 
graphically verify their common behavioral patterns. The end product is the 
theoretical and experimental verifications of the relationship between these two 
models. This will also enable some explanations about how micro behaviors 
translate to macro dynamics. 
2 Background of Theory and Algorithm 
We begin with some definitions and a description of the tools to be used for 
the succeeding analyses. Assume that the number of participating agents in 
the game world is finite and fixed. Assume also that the number of strategies 
or actions that these agents can take is finite and fixed. Let n denote the total 
number of available strategies, and let Xi denote the relative frequency of 
agents that take strategy i, such that I:~=o Xi = 1, Xi ~ OVi. Note that x = 
(Xl, X2, ... ,Xn ) represents the distribution vector4 of strategy frequencies, 
whereas x in a normal-form game would represent the distribution vector 
of strategy probabilities. Let rn denote the subset of R+ defined as rn = 
{x E R+ I I:~=l Xi = 1, x ~ O}. Point x can move only on rn, the strategy 
space. The aggregate pure states are represented by the vertices of r n , and 
the aggregate mixed states by all the points off the vertices. The core rule 
of the game is determined by a payoff matrix Anxn = (aij), where aij or, 
eiAej, is the payoff for taking pure strategy i when all the agents in the 
4 The vector notation used throughout this paper ignores the row/column dis-
tinctions. Thus, xAx means x TAx. 
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game world would take pure strategy j. In general, the payoff for taking pure 
strategy i is given by ei Ax. Additionally, xAx gives the average payoff to 
agents in the game world, since x is the distribution of frequencies. At an 
individual level , the task of strategy optimization is to choose the strategy i 
such that i = arg maxk ekAx. This strategy will surely be a pure strategy for 
the individuals , meaning that the optimal strategy for an individual cannot 
occur in intrn. Given this , let us define the individuals ' (pure) strategy set 
P = {i E N1 I ei Ern}. However, the Nash equilibrium and stable points 
may occur at x E intrn in the "aggregate" level. By definition, the Nash 
equilibrium is the state x* where 
x * Ax* ~ xAx* Vx Ern. (1) 
All these definitions are consistent with those of normal-form games , except 
that frequency is substituted for probabilities. 
2.1 A brief review of prototype deterministic evolutionary games 
It is usually feasible to analyze local behaviors of dynamics even without 
complete solutions, as we may identify the w-limit (a-limit) of a dynamics 
if the stability (unstability) exists around the equilibrium. An important 
concept used in evolutionary games is the evolutionarily stable state (ESS) 
By definition, the necessary and sufficient condition for the state x* to be 
5 In evolutionary games and its derivatives, it is at the aggregate level that a 
state (rather than strategy) can be mixed. 
the ESS is for the inequality 
x*Ax> xAx (2) 
to hold for all x =1= x* in the neighborhood of x* in rn. When an ESS, x*, 
is to be intruded by a state x =1= x* with meta-frequency E, the inequality 
EX* Ax + (1 - E)X* Ax* > ExAx + (1 - E)xAx* 
must be satisfied for x* to dominate the intruder x. By rewriting this, we 
find 
(1 - E) [x* Ax* - xAx*] + E [x* Ax - xAx] > O. (3) 
In the limit as E approaches zero, (3) becomes equivalent to inequality (1), 
the definition of the Nash equilibrium. In a special case of the Nash equilib-
rium where x* Ax* = xAx* for some x =1= x*, (3) becomes equivalent to in-
equality (2), which is the definition of the ESS. Intuitively, if some frequency 
distribution other than the Nash equilibrium's frequency distribution is as 
optimal on the equilibrium, then the Nash equilibrium's frequency distri-
bution must be superior to the other distribution on all the neighborhood 
points so that the state will be brought back to the equilibrium. 
To allow this model to involve dynamics, evolutionary game theorists 
often employ the replicator equation (Taylor and Johnker, 1978; Schuster 
and Sigmund, 1983). The rate of growth (or of adoption) of a certain strategy 
is defined by the relative optimality of the performance of strategy i, namely 
the payoff for taking pure strategy i minus the mean payoff in the game 
7 
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world. Hence, it is expressed as 
(log Xi) = eiAx - xAx, (4) 
or equivalently, 
(5) 
This represents the standard form of the replicator equation when the payoff 
function is linear with matrix A. From (4), we get 
Thus, 
(6) 
provided Xj =1= O. In the equilibrium, the ratio of a strategy's frequency to 
the other's frequency stays constant, or the time differential of the ratio is 
zero. So (6) indicates that x will be an equilibrium in intrn if and only if 
it satisfies 
(7) 
The concepts presented so far concerns the dynamics in continuous time. 
Dekel and Scotchmer (1992) and Cabrales and Sobel (1992) present the 
versions for discrete time. The formula 
(8) 
can be considered as the least objectionable candidate for the replicator 
equation in discrete time. A constant e is selected so that eiAxt + e will 
always be positive. Yet, our interpretation of e will be rather different, 
9 
as will be discussed later (see Theorem 2). This discrete version of the 
replicator equation does not convey all the properties of the continuous 
version. Like the case where we compute ordinary differential equations 
using the Euler's method, periodic cycles which would be observed in (5) will 
be lost and the trajectories will converge to bdrn when (8) is substituted 
for (5). However, (8) plays an important role when the theory discussed in 
this section is associated with ABMs involving Monte Carlo learning. The 
main reason is that ABMs intrinsically assume discrete time. 
2.2 Agent-based models with Monte Carlo learning 
Computational economics that uses ABMs has borrowed an idea from arti-
ficial intelligence, in that an agent perceives the state of the world, processes 
the information using internal functions, and returns a strategy - "action" is 
the term in AI - that optimizes the current and/or delayed payoff to himself 
(most general AI textbooks start with this concept, ego Russell and Norvig, 
1995). The algorithms for agents' internal functions vary. It could be sim-
ple condition-action rules, network-based regressions, statistical learning, 
or evolutionary algorithms. In our study, Monte Carlo learning is analyzed 
because of its strong relationship with the theory discussed in the previous 
section. When multiple agents are put in the game world, an agent's inter-
action with the world implicitly means his interaction with other agents. 
This logic justifies the use of ABMs for experimentations of games. 
Evolutionary games and distributed Monte Carlo learning 10 
An agent could choose the optimal strategy, i, for the next time step 
such that 
where pdf(·) is probability density function. However, the problem here is 
that he may not have perfect information of pdf (xt+l ) for all xt+l E r n , 
which he would roughly learn from life experiences. In our model, a simple 
AI is used for agents to learn directly the mapping of strategy-state pairs 
into expected payoff set6 in the following way. Let n = {( i, xt) liE P, xt E 
rn} be the set of (n + 1)-tupple parameters of strategy-state pairs, and 
v = {Vt+l E Rl } be the set such that vt+l is the prediction of the value of 
eiAxt+l . Generally, an agent's internal function will be given in the form 
F : n ---+ v. (9) 
This can be considered as prediction, since the agent expects that strategy i 
will cause the next period's payoff of e iAxt+l to turn out , having observed 
xt in the current period. Alternatively, a recency-weighted observation of 
(I-A) 2::!=1 At-k-1xk may be substituted for xt of n in (9). While this sort 
of function is often realized by regression models or neural networks, let us 
adopt a discretized state model (tabular state space) for simplicity. Suppose 
that rn is separated into non-overlapping subsets such that Uz rr = rn and 
rr n r~ = 0 for all m =1= l, which obviously implies rr c rnVl. Preferably, 
6 It is sound to believe that real human agents learn the direct mapping rather 
than probability. In Bayesian updating, learning for probability rather than direct 
mapping is concerned. 
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each rr should have equal size. Define the new set t2 = {(i, l) liE P, rr c 
rn}, and with a discrete indexing by l, (9) can be rewritten as 
P: t2 ~ v. (10) 
This function exhibits a minor weakness, in that all the states x belonging 
to category l are considered identical. However, it has an advantage when 
learning occurs from sampling. Given the function, agents will take strat-
egy i = argmaxk P(k, l). Occasional explorations of not taking the optimal 
strategies are also important, for the reason that agents have to experi-
ence all the i-l combinations so that they enable P to be effective for most 
situations, if not all. 
Learning, in this context, refers to the process of modifying function (10) 
so that it will return more and more accurate prediction values. To make 
writing simple, let Vi,l = P( i, l) denote the predicted value returned by the 
function P( i, l). That is, if the learning is fast enough (and if the equilibrium 
is not very unstable), we expect that Vi ,l eventually converges to e iAxt+l 
for xt E rr in the limit as t approaches positive infinity. To introduce Monte 
Carlo learning, assume for the moment that an agent always perceives land 
takes strategy i. With this assumption, the estimated value of Vi,l at time t 
by average of samples is 
t 
Vf,l = L eiAxk It. 
k=l 
This is straightforward, yet the agent may run up his memory in this case, 
ie. he has to memorize all the payoffs in the past t time steps. An alternative 
Evolutionary games and distributed Monte Carlo learning 12 
learning rule equivalent to the above one is 
(11) 
Now, the agent needs to memorize only two terms for learning. (11) executes 
equally weighted averaging of all the past payoffs. This algorithm works 
well if the world is deterministic in that the transition from xt to xt+l is 
guaranteed. However, the learning with (11) will be always obsolete if the 
world is stochastic. To make (11) a recency-weighted learning, we substitute 
a constant a E (0,1) for lit in (11) so we have 
t [A t t-l] t-l Vi l = a e i x - Vi l + Vi l . 
, " 
(12) 
The larger the value of a, the more recency-weighted is learning. This is 
evidenced by the following logic: 
t [A t t-l] t-l 
v· l = a ei x - v· l + v· l 1., 1., 1., 
= aeiAxt + (1 - a)aeiAxt-l + (1 - a)2aeiAxt-2 + ... 
t 
~ L a(l - a)t-ueiAxu . 
u=l 
This parameter for the degree of recency-weighting, a, may be associated 
with what Roth and Erev (1995) would refer to as the degree of "forgetting," 
though their views might be slightly different. Besides, it also accounts for 
what Friedman (1998) refered to as "inertia" which is one of the most sig-
nificant properties of evolutionary games. From another viewpoint, a works 
as the parameter to control the behaviors observed in macro dynamics, as 
will be discussed later. Conversely, we may calibrate a by the backward 
computation from the data of an observed macro dynamics. 
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It is unrealistic to assume that an agent always perceives l and takes 
strategy i. Unlike (11), recency-weighted learning (12) relaxes this assump-
tion. Thus, it is safe to apply the general game representations to the 
recency-weighted Monte Carlo learning. In summary, an agent queries his 
function if for the expected payoff of taking strategy i in state l, and chooses 
such i that maximizes V!,l' which is his estimate of eiAxt+1. At the same 
time, he modifies if by using (12) so that it will return more accurate values 
in the future. 
3 Connecting multi-agent Monte Carlo learning to the replicator 
equation 
In the previous section, agents ' learning was formalized at an individual 
level. We need a slight modification of the model in order to extend the al-
gorithm to the analyses of aggregate behaviors. With the assumption that 
one-step transition among rf, rr , ... makes small differences, the negative 
effects from eliminating our distinction of vL by l will be offset by the in-
troduction of distribution-based notation of vf. 
Definition 1. We define the estimated payoff of strategy i E P weighted 
by its frequency as the total value estimate of strategy i. Let v! denote the 
total value of vf , which is the estimate of the total value of eiAx, namely 
(The following describes the rationale for employing the total value esti-
mates for the aggregate model. It is only among that frequency of popula-
Evolutionary games and distributed Monte Carlo learning 14 
tion, xr, that strategy i is "believed" to be the maximizer of eiAxt. Hence, 
the population of at least and at most this frequency (xD will encounter 
the payoff of eiAxt and update the function P of (10) with the error given 
by eiAxt - vf for each agent. Hence, the aggregate error of this population 
-t 
can be defined as XHeiAxt - ~l (= x~eiAxt - vf)·) With the individual 
Monte Carlo learning (12) being modified for the total value estimate, the 
aggregate Monte Carlo learning can be defined as 
(13) 
For these definitions of aggregated Monte Carlo learning, we put the follow-
ing sound assumptions: 
Assumption 1: 
Assumption 2: 
The first assumption states that the strategy that causes the least payoff will 
attract less than the average frequency. The second assumption states that 
the total value estimate of the smallest payoff is less than the average of total 
value estimates. Now, let variable 8(yt) as a function of yt = (vi, v~, ... ,v;) 
denote some value that is related to the distribution of yt. With this def-
inition, the following formula can be hypothesized as an estimate of state 
transition for the aggregate behavior of Monte Carlo agents. 
(14) 
The endogenous variable 8(yt) must satisfy the condition that v;+l + 8(yt) 
be positive for all i. 
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Given the definition of the aggregate recency-weighted Monte Carlo 
learning (13) , the hypothesized rule (14) will transform as follows. 
V~+l + 8(yt) X~+l '= __ ~t~~~~ __ 
t • 2::j (VJ+l + 8(yt)) 
axr . eiAxt + (1 - a)vr + 8(vt) 
Let us define eji and 'ljJt as 
¢/ = (1 - a)vr + 8(yt) and 
axr 
t 2:: j (1 - a)v; + n8(yt) 
'IjJ = , 
a 
thus enabling (15) to be written in the simple form 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
The update rule (17) thus resembles the discrete replicator equation (8). 
Lemma 1 (8) and (17) (and thus (14)) are equivalent if and only if ej} = 
Proof Substitute e for eji and 'ljJt in (17), and the sufficiency is obvious. 
Necessity by contrapositive: if e =1= ¢/ Ve =1= 'ljJt, then (8) and (17) cannot 
be equivalent . 0 
Since (8) is (merely) suggested as a candidate (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 
1998), (17) would still represent the discrete replicator equation even if 
eji =1= 'ljJt as long as appropriate normalization is executed on xt+l. Yet, our 
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study sticks to the case where qi equals 'l/J t . By equating q} to 'l/J t in (16), 
we get the endogenous variable 
(18) 
For (17) to be equivalent to (8), this equation of the endogenous variable 
(18) must be equal for a given t for all i. 
Lemma 2 The endogenous variable (18) for a given t is equal for all i E P 
in the game. 
In order to prove this lemma, consider two cases: (a) x is an equilibrium at 
the center of rn; and (b) other cases. (case (b) covers (a) as well.) 
Proof - Case (a): x is an equilibrium at the center of rn 
If the frequency distribution is an equilibrium, eiAx = ejAx (= c) holds 
from (7), where we use c to denote the corresponding value. With the def-
inition of the aggregate recency-weighted Monte Carlo learning (13), this 
translates to vI - (1 - a)v;-l = aXiC for all i. Using this equation, (18) can 
be rewritten as 
17 
Since limt--+oo (1 - a)t+l = 0, this eventually can be simplified to 
(19) 
For the case where x is at the center of r n , we have Xi = Xj (= ~) for 
all i and j. The endogenous variable 8(vt) turns out to be independent of 
strategy if x is an equilibrium at the center of intrn. D 
From (14) in conjugate with (18) and (19), any underestimated total values 
of payoff on average (vf Vi) cannot fall short of eiA x(1 - a)/n. 
Proof - Case (b) : other cases 
First, define f3ij such that vj = vf . f3ij for all i and j. Obviously, f3ij equals 
f3;/. Then, (18) can be written as 
Variable 8(vt) is equal for all the n strategies if and only if 
(20) 
for all i and k. By the way, the next two equations are true from our defi-
nitions. 
vf Ej f3kj 
vk E j f3ij 
LX~ = 1. 
and 
(21) 
One way to ensure our argument is to show that (21) is sufficient for (20). We 
will show this only for the case of n = 2. Since we have (21) or l - xt -x~ = 0, 
vi(1 - xi - x~) = v~(1 - xi - x~) = 0 or 
Evolutionary games and distributed Monte Carlo learning 
vf(1 + xi - 2xi - x~) = v~(1 + x~ - xi - 2x~) or 
v~ + x~(vi + v~) - 2v~x~ 
vi + v~ 
v~ + x~(vi + v~) - nv~x~ 
vi + v~ 
18 
or 
(22) 
Now, in order to eliminate vi and v~ from (22), we use the following equa-
tions derived from our definition. 
and similarly, 
Given this, (22) can be rewritten as 
1 + x~(2=j ,8lj - n) 1 + xi(2:=j ,82j - n) 
or 
2:=j ,8lj 2:=j ,82j 
(2::: ,82j) (1 - x~ - xi 2::: ,8lj) = (2::: ,8lj)(1 - xi - x~ 2::: ,82j) or 
j j 
j j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
1 - x~ 2:=j ,82j 
1 - xi 2:=j ,8lj 
By relating (21) and the above equation, we get 
which exhibits exactly the same form as (20). 0 
j 
1- xin 
1 - x~n· 
j 
Since e has the domain (- mini eiAxt, 00), we can have q} = 'lj;t = e if 
and only if the proposition of the following lemma is true. 
19 
specified in Table 1. 
Proof Since the implication of Lemma 2 is qi = 'ljJt Vi, we can use (18) 
for this proof, and we only need to show e iAxt + q/ > 0 Vi. It is clear 
that e iAxt + q/ > 0 Vi {::::::::} mini e iAxt + qi > O. Let subscript i denote 
argminj ejAxt + qi. By substituting (18), the value of qi in (16) will be 
The addition of e iAxt to the above equation yields 
ae~ + (1 - a)¢~ 
a(1 - x~n) 
where ~ = (1 - x;n )eiAxt and ¢; = 2:j vj - nvf. By Assumption 1, the 
denominator is positive, implying the equivalence between the positivity of 
eiAxt + qi and that of ae~ + (1- a)¢~ (numerator). Besides, this tells that 
e~%O ¢:} e~Axt%O. Similarly, by Assumption 2, ¢t > 0 holds. 
(A) when eiAxt > 0: Since ae~ + (1 - a)¢; is a convex set in Rl with e~ 
satisfies the first column of Table 1. 
(B) when eiAxt :::; 0 and a is relatively low: The inequality ae;+(I-a)¢; > 
o is equivalent to a < (M~e~' Thus, all a < ¢~~e~ (that are relatively low, but 
greater than 0) will satisfy eiAxt + qi > 0 for the condition corresponding 
to the first row - second column of Table 1. 
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mini eiAxt 
>0 ::;0 
relatively low Yes Yes 
a 
relatively high Yes Yes/No 
Table 1 The conditions in which Lemma 3 and Theorem 1 do and do not hold. 
(C) when eiAxt ::; 0 and a is relatively high: From (B), all a ::; ¢~~e~ fail 
to satisfy eiAxt + ¢/ > o. If ¢~~e~ ::; 1, we have "No" for the second row -
second column of Table 1. However, if ¢!~e! is greater than one or is outside 
of the domain of a, then we have "Yes" for all the entries of Table 1. 0 
Finally, we arrive at the following theorem, which is the main claim of this 
paper. 
Theorem 1 The discrete replicator equation (8) and the aggregate model 
of distributed Monte Carlo learning (14) are equivalent for those conditions 
specified in Table 1. 
Proof Since e in (8) is the parameter to be freely selected in (- mini eiAxt, 00), 
implies eji = 'lj;t Vi. Given this and Lemma 3, there exists some value of e 
such that (pt = 'lj;t = e > - mini eiAxt for those conditions specified in 
Table 1. Hence, from Lemma 1, we conclude the truth of the proposition of 
Theorem 1. 0 
Equation (14) with the endogenous variable defined in (18) represents the 
aggregate Monte Carlo rule that is equivalent to the discrete replicator 
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equation (8) for those conditions specified in Table 1. Equation (14) may 
be considered as the medium of the agent based models and the replica-
tor equation that , we expect , will give rise to a formal process in which 
computational and theoretical models will be fused. Surely, it relies on the 
assumptions made at the beginning of this section. 
4 Experiments: how aggregate fluctuations are related to the 
degree of individuals' recency-weighting 
Having seen the theoretical aspect of the relationship between the two mod-
els, one might be tempted to observe and compare the simulation results 
of them. Let us take a simple zero-sum game as an example. The payoff 
matrix is defined as 
o 1 -1 
A= 
-1 0 1 
1 -1 0 
In this case, it is concluded from (4) that 
(log Xl) + (lOgX2) + (logX3) = 0 or 
d 
dt (log XIX2 X 3) = 0 or 
(23) 
(24) 
Hence, the trajectories draw periodic cycles around the equilibrium point 
in intr3 with XIX2X3 being a constant of motion. Fig. 1 (a) depicts typical 
motions of periodic cycle in intr3 . If we assume continuous time, equation 
(5) can be used to simulate the dynamics of (23). An experiment with the 
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(a) (b) 
Continuous Replicator Dynamics (Runge-Kutta) 
[ ::j \\u' :-V\\u·.' \ F: 
OJ 0.3 . . 
~ , I 
0 . 2 ',- ./' _/' 
10.0 2000 
time (1 step = 0.01 t) 
Fig. 1 (a) Trajectories of periodic cycles where the game is a special case of zero-
sum game. (b) A result of simulation using the continuous replicator equation 
with fourth-order Runge Kutta method. 
fourth-order Runge-Kutta method gives a result illustrated by Fig. 1 (b). 
Clearly, it follows a periodic cycle that agrees with (24) and Fig. 1 (a). 
However, as briefly mentioned earlier, the assumption of discrete time 
makes the consequences quite different. Let us assume that the parameter 
~ is sufficiently large such that eiAx be positive for all i. Note that xAx is 
always zero for (23). The Nash equilibrium (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is not the ESS 
since x* Ax - xAx = 0 (see (2)). Now, let us define the function 
and we have 
3 
V(x) = II x~:, 
i=l 
. 3 . 
V = Lx*X i 
V t' X· i=l t 
(25) 
While equation (25) assumes continuous time, we can approximate the value 
of Xi for the discrete version (8) by using the leapfrog method, as 
1 t eiAxt + e t x t- 1 Axt- 1 + e-1 
= 2 [xi xt Axt + ~t - Xi eiAxt-1 + ~t-l 1 
x~ eiAxt eiAxt-1 
= 2[---zt + eiAxt - 1 + e-11 . 
Substitute this in (25), and we get 
Since 
it turns out that 
v 
V < 0, 
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Function V is a negative gradient-like Lyapunov function. Thus, all non-
equilibrium states in intr3 will converge to bdr3 . However, this may not 
be the case when e takes a large value, since we have 
lim V = o. 
~---->oo 
(26) 
For a reasonably large value of e, the discrete replicator dynamics will 
behave like the continuous version. Additionally, we find 
d V 1 3 eiAxt- 1 d~t-l (V) = -"6 ~ (eiAxt- 1 + ~t-l )2 
> 0 v~t-l > - m~n eiAxt- 1, x =1= x*. 
t 
Since V IV < 0, this means that the larger values of e will lead to flatter 
gradients. 
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Fig. 2 Results of simulation using the discrete replicator equation (a) for e = 
5.0, and (b) for e = 25.0. 
Fig. 2 (a) is a result of (23) with the discrete replicator equation (8) 
for ~t = 5.0, and Fig. 2 (b) for e = 25.0. States gradually converge to the 
boundary subset of r 3 , and the period of cycles becomes longer as time 
passes. Smaller value of e causes more rapid convergence. More formally, 
we arrive at the following theorem. 
Theorem 2 The parameter e of the discrete replicator equation (8) is 
likely to be inversely related with the degree of agents ' recency-weighting, Q. 
25 
Proof We ideally need the assumption that the total value estimates are not 
affected by a , as if they were exogenous (Appendix B presents the difficulty 
without this assumption; however, this assumption is valid for many cases, 
as presented in Appendix B). Then, from (16) , we have 
ael} 
aa = - xHv; + b(yt)]/(axD2 
~ -XHV;+1 + b(yt)]/(ax;)2 < 0, and similarly 
Since Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 hold, we are likely to have ae / aa < 0 too. 
D 
Intuitively, smaller e causes agents to respond more sensitively to the 
current state (obvious from (8)) , and agents with greater degree of recency-
weighting, a, behave in a similar way. Theorem 2 in conjugate with V < 0 
and d~t (~) > 0 for the special case of (23) implies that a group of more 
recency-weighting agents tends to generate rapid growth of wave amplitude, 
which is graphically evidenced by Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. This makes sense also 
from the following example. Assume that the states {x I Xl > X2 ~ X3} 
continue for some duration (eg. t = 100 to 110). At t = 111, the ordering of 
V3 > VI > V2 will prevail among most (if not all) agents if they put heavy 
weights on the recent experiences due to (12). On the other hand, less 
recency-weighting agents do not necessarily make such temporarily biased 
ordering depending on what experiences they had from t = 0 to 99. In this 
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Agent-Based Monte Carlo Dynamics 
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(b) Agent-Based Monte Carlo Dynamics 
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Fig. 3 Results of simulation using multi-agent Monte Carlo learning (a) for more 
recency-weighting parameter (ex = 0.5), (b) for less recency-weighting parameter 
(ex = 0.1), and (c) for the least recency-weighting parameter (ex = 0.00001). 
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case, a group of more recency-weighting agents tends to lean toward e3 more 
than a group of less recency-weighting agents. In the next phase, this will 
be the case with e2, and so on. Hence, as stated in Sec. 2.2, a can be used 
as a controlable parameter that affects macro dynamics, and conversely, we 
can calibrate a from the data of an observed meso or macro scale dynamic. 
Similar phenomena can be observed in multi-agent simulation. Fig. 3 
(a) shows a typical result of the simulation with multi-agent Monte Carlo 
learning for a = 0.5, and Fig. 3 (b) for a = 0.1 . The trajectories are not such 
neat lines as numerical solutions because decision-making is made by each of 
autonomous agents, and the frequency vector only reflects the consequences 
of bottom-up processes. However, its pattern of convergence to bdr t and 
periods of cycles resemble those of the discrete replicator dynamics. Notice 
that Fig. 2 (a) and (b) are analogous to Fig. 3 (a) and (b), respectively. 
This, again, evidences the relationship between parameter e and the agents' 
degree of recency-weighting a, the proposition of which is found in Theorem 
2. Additionally, (26) and Theorem 2 imply that an extremely small value of 
a generates periodic cycles, almost like the continuous replicator dynamics. 
This is also evidenced by a result of the simulation with multi-agent Monte 
Carlo learning for a = 0.00001, shown in Fig. 3 (c). Notice that Fig. 3 (c) 
is analogous to Fig. 1 in its appearance 7 , rather than Fig. 2. Hence, the 
7 For the convenience to restrict our concern to the deterministic evolutionary 
game, it is stated so. However, if the topic were extended to include stochastic 
evolutionary games, this result would need to be associated with the stochastic 
dynamics presented by Foster and Young (1990) . 
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distributed Monte Carlo learning model can be related not only with the 
discrete replicator equation (8) , but also with the continuous version (5). 
5 Conclusions and discussions 
A tight relationship between the multi-agent simulation with Monte Carlo 
learning and the prototype evolutionary game theory with replicator equa-
tions was proved and experimentally evidenced. This not only shows the 
similarity of the dynamics in these two models. It also formalizes the process 
by which micro behaviors of autonomous agents translate to the aggregate 
dynamics of a society at large (ie. fluctuation pattern in macro dynamics 
was derived from micro factors of recency-weighting.). This result provides 
a basis for prospective theories bridging micro and macro dynamics models. 
Moreover, it demonstrates that the experimental results of simulations with 
distributed intelligence can be backed up by theories to a reasonable extent. 
An additional contribution of the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 is to 
illustrate the intuitively mysterious constant e in (8). The relationship be-
tween the ABMs and the replicator model has added an interpretation of e 
as being associated with the degree of agents' recency-weighting. This sug-
gests the possibility that the seemingly chaotic behaviors of ABMs may be 
explained by theoretical models with varying degrees of recency weighting. 
The consequence of this paper poses an interesting question. The ABMs' 
side of the evolution is considered active, since learning based on expected 
payoff optimization is the result of intentional computation. On the other 
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hand, the nature of prototype evolutionary game is considered to be passive 
at the micro level, due to the premise made by most biologists and ecologists 
that natural selection drives evolution that relies mostly on chance. If the 
results presented in this paper are valid (ie. the definition and assumptions 
made in Sec. 3 are appropriate), then this implies that active behaviors of 
economic agents and passive being (such as genes) give rise to the equiva-
lent dynamics. At this point, there is no sufficient logic with this to affect 
the recent disputes on the validity of biological metaphors in evolutionary 
economics. As far as economics is concerned, we could argue that the dom-
inance of evolutionary process might vanish the macro effects of agent-wise 
activeness . In this case, the question arises "how big of a role does micro 
activeness play in determining the macro dynamics?" This clearly depends 
on the complexity of agent interactions, or the network structure. We have 
analyzed the effects of a micro factor, a, on macro dynamics. However, this 
is far from all. 
As mentioned previously, Monte Carlo learning is one of the most fun-
damental algorithms to decide the process of agent learning. For example, 
Sutton and Barto (1998) extended Monte Carlo learning to develop major 
reinforcement learning algorithms, such as Q-Iearning and Sarsa. With com-
putational reinforcement learning, an agent can learn the future-cumulative 
payoff of a strategy by bootstrapping the expected values of those states 
that the strategy he chose will stochastically lead to. With this property 
of reinforcement learning, agents will cope more effectively with repeated 
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games than Monte Carlo agents can. Interestingly, a slight modification to 
equation (12) with a flavor of the Bellman equation or dynamic program-
ming (Bellman, 1957) will realize some reinforcement learning algorithms. 
Thus, the aggregate reinforcement learning will be easily defined with some 
forms similar to (15). Our study leaves open extensions to these and many 
other learning algorithms. It is expected that a series of such works on com-
plex systems will help bridge the computational and theoretical fields , and 
as well as micro and macro dynamics models. 
Appendix A: The Algorithm of Agent-Based Monte Carlo Learn-
ing 
A simplified pseudocode for the agent-based Monte Carlo learning is pre-
sented below. The characters and symbols used here are consistent with 
those in the text. 
A .1. Model program 
repeat until program terminates 
for each strategy i do 
end do 
for each agent do 
i f- agent:chooseStrategy( {xi-I, X~-l, ... ,X~-l} ) 
Xi f- Xi + 1.0 / totalNumberOfAgents 
end do 
for each strategy i do 
eiAx +--- L:j aij x Xj 
end do 
for each agent do 
agent.·learn( {e1Ax, e2Ax, ... ,enAx} ) 
end do 
end repeat 
A.2. Strategy choice by an agent 
agent:chooseStrategy( state) 
1 +--- categorize( state) 
bestPayoff +--- -(X) 
end 
for each strategy i do 
if Vil > bestPayoff then 
bestPayoff +--- Vil 
strategy +--- i 
end if 
end do 
return strategy 
A.3. Learning by an agent 
agent:learn(payoffSet) 
for each strategy i do 
31 
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if i = strategy then 
end if 
end do 
end 
Appendix B: Path-Dependence Consideration on the Relationship 
between e and ex 
Since Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 hold, we treat e, q/, and 'lj;t as identical 
parameters. Let us take (pt as representative, and consider it as a function 
of 0:'. Before analyzing the sensitivity of q/ to 0:', we need to take a look at 
that of vf. From (13), we derive 
- [ t-l .A t-l -t-lj 
- Xi e t x - Vi 
a-t - 2 
(1 ) [ t-2 A t - 2 -t-2j (1 )2 Vi + - 0:' Xi ei x - Vi + - 0:' a;;-
t 
'"'"' "(1 - )k [ t - k-l .A t-k-l _ -t-k-lj 
'"'"' D 0:' Xi e t x Vi . 
k=O 
Intuitively, this value represents the recency-weighted cumulative errors of 
aggregate estimates, or aggregate reminiscence of past errors. Here, the 
errors are in terms of the degree of underestimates. Let ARP Ef (standing 
for Aggregate Reminiscence of Past Errors) denote the value of avfj aO:'. 
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ARP E is truely chaotic and path-dependent unless a = 1 - or the dynamics 
is at least locally stable. 
Now let us turn to the sensitivity of q} to a. From (16), we derive 
We know lima~l dq/ Ida = O. Thus, it is necessary that d2 (pt Ida2 < 0 for 
the domain of a to have the inverse relationship with e. However , d2 q/ I da2 
depends more sophisticatedly on the path-dependent terms of ARP E's. 
Hence, we simply make a weak argument as presented in Theorem 2. For-
tunately, we may find many cases where ARP E; eventually vanishes , such 
as the dynamics with exponential stability, oscillatory stability, and expo-
nential unstability due to the boundedness of rn (major counter-examples 
are oscillatory unstability and limit cycles). In such cases, Theorem 2 will 
be stronger. 
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Abstract This paper presents a tight relationship between evolutionary 
game theory and distributed intelligence models. After reviewing some exist-
ing theories of replicator dynamics and distributed Monte Carlo learning, we 
make formulations and proofs of the equivalence between these two models. 
The relationship will be revealed not only from a theoretical viewpoint, but 
also by experimental simulations of the models by taking a simple symmet-
ric zero-sum game ap an example. As a consequence, it will be verified that 
seemingly chaotic macro dynamics generated by distributed micro-decisions 
can be explained with theoretical models. 
2 Yuya Sasaki 
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1 Introduction: significance of the topic 
Evolutionary game theory and computational economics! are two of the 
latest fields to account for evolutionary processes of economics. When it 
comes to a problem of aggregate behavior, the former seems to have a 
limited ability to incorporate micro behaviors of each economic agent, while 
the latter often fails in formalizing the processes. Indeed, computational 
simulation practitioners empirically know that a collection of rule-based or 
learnable autonomous agents usually leads to an emergent outcome that 
partially agrees with the theoretically expected one , but the process by 
which distributed intelligence translates to such an outcome has been seldom 
understood (the difficulty of rigorous analyses is stated by Maes (1995)). 
However , the field also exhibits flexibilities which can be associated with 
existing theories of dynamics. 
In this paper, we present the equivalence between the prototype the-
ory of deterministic evolutionary games and the computational model of 
1 Computational economics varies in its sub-fields. For example, there are (i) nu-
merical dynamics, (ii) numerical optimization (iii) heuristic optimization, and (iv) 
bottom-up processes by autonomous entities, etc. In this paper, we will narrow-
sightedly refer to only (iv) as "computational economics." 
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distributed-agent Monte Carlo learning. Monte Carlo learning was selected 
mainly for two reasons. First, it lays a foundation for many of the other 
learning algorithms , especially Q-learning and Sarsa algorithms (Barto and 
Singh, 1990; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Second, unlike evolutionary algo-
rithms , its simple form makes it easier to extend the algorithm to be associ-
ated with economic theory. Before discussing the main ideas, let us identify 
the relative roles and the historical background of evolutionary game theory, 
computational distributed-agent models, and learning. 
Several methodologies have been developed to explain aggregate behav-
iors of multiple economic agents where strategic decision-making is involved. 
Normal-form theoretical models have played a basic role. While bearing out 
the theory of games von Neumann devoted himself to the development of 
self-reproductive machines and cellular automata (von Neumann, 1966) , 
that later was to produce what is called artificial life or ALife (Langton, 
1989). Artificial life has in turn motivated computer-based experimental 
scientists to model games of complex systems that generate emergent dy-
namics. However , few researchers have made attempts to merge these two 
distant fields of von Neumann's legacy 2. 
While some economists were acquiring a new model of games which 
stem from the initial developments by Maynard Smith (1974), biologists had 
2 Some early 1990s' pioneering works (eg. Holland and Miller (1991) ; Arthur 
(1993)) have attempted to merge economic theory and autonomous intelligence 
models. Judd (1997) and Judd (2001) discuss the potential roles of computational 
economics in emerging economic theory. 
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started to employ computational and individual-based models (IBMs) to ex-
amine bottom-up behaviors of ecological dynamics (eg. Dewdney, 1984). To-
day, the contributions of IBMs are not restricted to applied problems, but in-
clude theoretical problems in population and community ecology (Haefner, 
1996). On the other hand, the theoretical dynamics model of determinis-
tic evolutionary games, or replicator dynamics (Taylor and Johnker, 1978; 
Schuster and Sigmund, 1983)3, was shown by Hofbauer (1981) to be equiva-
lent to an ecological dynamics model, namely the Lotka-Volterra equation. 
This sequence of events suggests the possibility of merging IBMs into the 
formulations of deterministic evolutionary games. 
While the deterministic evolutionary games were becoming obsolete for 
game theorists, they certainly absorbed economists in the 1990s (Friedman 
(1991); and for stochastic version later by Kandori et al et al (1993)) . Unlike 
the passive being of chromosomes in biological systems, economic agents ex-
hibit active characteristics (ie. learning). It was therefore a natural course 
for economists to turn their attention to this dynamic aspect (eg. Roth 
and Erev, 1995; Dosi, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998, etc.) . Computational experiments as well as psychological laboratory 
experiments complement theory in this aspect . One way to demonstrate 
how to use computational experiments in learning is to employ agent-based 
3 Extensions and analyses of the replicator dynamics, multi-agent dynamics, 
and other derivatives were made by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988; 1998; 2003), 
Cressman (1992), Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Swinkels (1993), Weibull (1997), 
etc. 
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simulations or agent-based models (ABMs; also called agent-based compu-
tational economics or ACE), a sub-field of computational economics (for an 
overview, see Tesfatsion, 2002) . 
ABMs in economics are the analogues of IBMs in biology. In ABMs, 
some other forms of learnable functions (eg. Monte Carlo sampling, statis-
tical learning, reinforcement learning, neural networks, evolutionary algo-
rithms, etc.) are embedded in each economic agent, and the agents behave 
autonomously by querying their internal function for the optimal actions 
or strategies given the current state of the world. Hence, ABMs conduct 
the process of strategy optimization at a micro level. ABMs are usually 
employed to explain the sophisticated bottom-up processes of evolution-
ary economics, which would be infeasible with top-down theoretical models 
(Tesfatsion, 2000) . While it appears that the principles of ABMs researchers 
and those of game theorists have diverged more than converged, the concept 
of the replicator dynamics roughly agrees with simple learnable ABMs, as 
will be shown in later sections. 
In this paper we begin by briefly reviewing the basis of existing theo-
ries of deterministic evolutionary games and the algorithm of distributed 
Monte Carlo learning (Sec. 2). Then, our discussion moves on to formula-
tions and proofs of the equivalence of evolutionary game theory and multi-
agent Monte Carlo learning (Sec . 3). Our method does not rely on the field's 
convention of using the hypothetico-deductive approach, but will instead 
start with the somewhat farfetched connection of the two models' formu-
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lations. In Sec. 4, experimental results of ABMs will be compared to the 
theoretical dynamics model to graphically verify their common behavioral 
patterns. The end product is the theoretical and experimental verifications 
of the relationship between these two models. This will also enable some 
explanations about how micro behaviors translate to macro dynamics. 
2 Background of theory and algorithm 
We begin with some definitions and a description of the tools to be used for 
the succeeding analyses . Assume that the number of participating agents in 
the game world is finite and fixed. Assume also that the number of strategies 
or actions that these agents can take is finite and fixed. Let n denote the total 
number of available strategies, and let Xi denote the relative frequency of 
agents that take strategy i, such that L:~=o Xi = 1, Xi 2: OVi. Note that x = 
(Xl, X2,"', xn) represents the distribution vector4 of strategy frequencies, 
whereas x in a normal-form game would represent the distribution vector 
of strategy probabilities. Let rn denote the subset of R+ defined as rn = 
{x E R+ I L:~=l Xi = 1, x 2: o} . Point x can move only on rn, the strategy 
space. The aggregate pure states are represented by the vertices of r n , and 
the aggregate mixed states by all the points off the vertices. The core rule 
of the game is determined by a payoff matrix An x n = (aij), where aij or, 
eiAej, is the payoff for taking pure strategy i when all the agents in the 
4 The vector notation used throughout this paper ignores the row/column dis-
tinctions. Thus, xAx means x TAx. 
